package authenticator

import (
	"context"
	"crypto/hmac"
	"crypto/sha1"
	"fmt"
	"strings"

	"git.wxccs.org/iceking2nd/winauth-go/internal/global"
)

// Battle.Net paper-restore protocol constants. The server responds with
// a fixed 32-byte challenge to the initiate POST, and a fixed 20-byte
// secret to the validate POST. Mismatching sizes are treated as fatal
// since the binary protocol has no error envelope.
const (
	bnetRestoreChallengeSize = 32
	bnetRestoreSecretSize    = 20
	bnetSerialDigits         = 14 // CC-NNNN-NNNN-NNNN after stripping dashes
	bnetRestoreCodeLen       = 10
)

// Restore recovers an existing Battle.Net authenticator's secret key
// using the 10-character paper restore code the user wrote down when
// they first enrolled.
//
// The wire protocol mirrors the original WinAuth implementation:
//
//  1. POST <serial-ascii-bytes>   → /enrollment/initiatePaperRestore.htm
//     ← 32-byte challenge
//  2. HMAC-SHA1(key = restoreCode-decoded-10-bytes,
//     data = serial-bytes || challenge) → 20-byte signature
//  3. POST <serial || signature>  → /enrollment/validatePaperRestore.htm
//     ← 20-byte secret (the new SecretKey)
//
// SECURITY: restoreCode grants full account control if leaked. We do not
// log it, never persist it, and wipe the derived 10-byte key buffer
// before returning. The caller's restoreCode string is the caller's
// responsibility to manage.
func (b *BattleNetAuthenticator) Restore(ctx context.Context, serial, restoreCode string) error {
	const fn = "internal.authenticator.BattleNetAuthenticator.Restore"
	logger := global.Log.WithField("func", fn)

	cleanSerial := normalizeBnetSerial(serial)
	if len(cleanSerial) < bnetSerialDigits {
		return fmt.Errorf("battlenet: serial must contain %d digits after the region prefix", bnetSerialDigits)
	}
	region := cleanSerial[:2]
	if _, ok := battlenetURLs[region]; !ok {
		return fmt.Errorf("battlenet: unknown region %q in serial", region)
	}
	logger.WithField("region", region).Debug("starting paper restore")

	cleanCode := normalizeBnetRestoreCode(restoreCode)
	if len(cleanCode) != bnetRestoreCodeLen {
		return fmt.Errorf("battlenet: restore code must be %d characters", bnetRestoreCodeLen)
	}
	codeKey, err := decodeRestoreCode(cleanCode)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	// Zero the derived key on return so it does not linger in stack/heap
	// after the HMAC call has consumed it.
	defer func() {
		for i := range codeKey {
			codeKey[i] = 0
		}
	}()

	serialBytes := []byte(cleanSerial)

	challenge, err := bnetPostBinary(ctx, mobileURL(region)+bnetRestorePath, serialBytes)
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("battlenet: initiate restore: %w", err)
	}
	if len(challenge) != bnetRestoreChallengeSize {
		return fmt.Errorf("battlenet: restore challenge size %d, want %d",
			len(challenge), bnetRestoreChallengeSize)
	}

	mac := hmac.New(sha1.New, codeKey)
	_, _ = mac.Write(serialBytes)
	_, _ = mac.Write(challenge)
	signature := mac.Sum(nil)

	// POST body is serial-ascii || HMAC signature.
	validateBody := make([]byte, 0, len(serialBytes)+len(signature))
	validateBody = append(validateBody, serialBytes...)
	validateBody = append(validateBody, signature...)

	secret, err := bnetPostBinary(ctx, mobileURL(region)+bnetRestoreValidatePath, validateBody)
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("battlenet: validate restore: %w", err)
	}
	if len(secret) != bnetRestoreSecretSize {
		return fmt.Errorf("battlenet: restore secret size %d, want %d",
			len(secret), bnetRestoreSecretSize)
	}

	b.SecretKey = secret
	b.Serial = cleanSerial
	b.RestoreCodeVerified = true
	logger.WithField("serial", b.Serial).Info("paper restore succeeded")
	return nil
}

// normalizeBnetSerial strips spaces and dashes, upper-cases, and returns
// the canonical form ("CCNNNNNNNNNNNN", 14 ASCII bytes when valid).
func normalizeBnetSerial(s string) string {
	s = strings.ToUpper(strings.TrimSpace(s))
	s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "-", "")
	s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, " ", "")
	return s
}

// normalizeBnetRestoreCode strips formatting whitespace / dashes and
// upper-cases. The actual character-set validation happens in
// decodeRestoreCode.
func normalizeBnetRestoreCode(s string) string {
	s = strings.ToUpper(strings.TrimSpace(s))
	s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "-", "")
	s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, " ", "")
	return s
}

// decodeRestoreCode is the inverse of restoreByteToChar applied 10
// times in a row: each character maps back to one byte (low 5 bits
// populated). The 10-byte buffer is what the protocol uses as the
// HMAC-SHA1 key for the validate step.
func decodeRestoreCode(code string) ([]byte, error) {
	if len(code) != bnetRestoreCodeLen {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("battlenet: restore code must be %d characters", bnetRestoreCodeLen)
	}
	out := make([]byte, bnetRestoreCodeLen)
	for i := 0; i < bnetRestoreCodeLen; i++ {
		v, ok := restoreCharToByte(code[i])
		if !ok {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("battlenet: invalid character %q in restore code", code[i])
		}
		out[i] = v
	}
	return out, nil
}

// restoreCharToByte is the inverse of restoreByteToChar. The encoding
// uses a 5-bit value: 0–9 → '0'–'9', 10–25 → 'A'..'Z' but skipping
// I, L, O, S. We undo the skips to recover the original 5-bit value.
func restoreCharToByte(c byte) (byte, bool) {
	switch {
	case c >= '0' && c <= '9':
		return c - '0', true
	case c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z':
		// I, L, O, S are deliberately absent from the encoding alphabet
		// (visually similar to 1 / 1 / 0 / 5). Accepting them would map
		// to the wrong 5-bit value and silently corrupt the HMAC key.
		if c == 'I' || c == 'L' || c == 'O' || c == 'S' {
			return 0, false
		}
		v := int(c)
		if v >= 'T' {
			v--
		}
		if v >= 'P' {
			v--
		}
		if v >= 'M' {
			v--
		}
		if v >= 'J' {
			v--
		}
		v = v - 'A' + 10
		if v < 10 || v > 31 {
			return 0, false
		}
		return byte(v), true
	}
	return 0, false
}